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Tacit versus Overt Collusion
Firm Asymmetries and
Numbers: What’s the
Evidence?
Stephen Davies and Matthew Olczak*
It is conventional wisdom that collusion is more likely the fewer firms thereare in a market and the more symmetric they are. This is often theoretical-
ly justified in terms of a repeated non-cooperative game. Although that model
fits more easily with tacit than overt collusion, the impression sometimes
given is that ‘one model fits all’. Moreover, the empirical literature offers few
stylized facts on the most simple of questions—how few are few and how sym-
metric is symmetric? This paper attempts to fill this gap while also exploring
the interface of tacit and overt collusion, albeit in an indirect way. First, it
identifies the empirical model of tacit collusion that the European
Commission appears to have employed in coordinated effects merger cases—
apparently only fairly symmetric duopolies fit the bill. Second, it shows that,
intriguingly, the same story emerges from the quite different experimental lit-
erature on tacit collusion. This offers a stark contrast with the findings for a
sample of prosecuted cartels; on average, these involve six members (often
more) and size asymmetries among members are often considerable. The indi-
rect nature of this ‘evidence’ cautions against definitive conclusions; never-
theless, the contrast offers little comfort for those who believe that the same
model does, more or less, fit all.
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I. Introduction
This article explores a strangely under-documented topic in the empirical litera-
ture: Are there well-defined (i.e. observable and predictable) differences
between the market structures which give rise to tacit collusion as opposed to
overt collusion (cartels)?
It is certainly received wisdom that collusion is more likely to occur with fewer
leading players in a market and the more symmetric the players are. This was
recognised long ago in the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance para-
digm, and was subsequently formalized with the theory of repeated non-cooper-
ative games. This wisdom is also shared by practitioners. Dick1 explains that case
law embraces the presumption that suppliers’ ability to coordinate should be
closely linked to their fewness in numbers, quoting from FTC vs. PPG Industries2:
“[W]here rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their behaviour, either by
overt collusion or implicit understanding, in order to restrict output and achieve
profits above competitive levels.” (italics added). He goes on3 to provide a per-
suasive explanation of why asymmetries make collusion difficult.
However, in spite of this consensus, the empirical literature offers few stylized
facts on the most simple of questions—how few is few, how symmetric is symmet-
ric, and how, if at all, does this differ between the different forms of collusion? It
is true that, for cartels at least, we have extensive case evidence on firm numbers,
although less so on asymmetries; but for tacit collusion, remarkably little is
known about either. Given that the concept is somewhat elusive and not always
easy to tie down in practice, this is hardly surprising.
Unfortunately, if we turn to theory for answers, it is of little assistance. The
repeated game is best thought of as a model of tacit collusion, but it is also often
assumed to apply equally to cartels, (see added italics above) and there often
seems to be an implied presumption that one model fits all. Harrington is surely
justified in claiming4 that “there is a gap between antitrust practice—which dis-
tinguishes explicit and tacit collusion—and economic theory—which (general-
ly) does not.”
More generally, this nexus of overt and tacit collusion raises a number of pol-
icy-relevant questions: “How far are tacit collusion and cartels seen as substi-
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1. A. R. DICK, Coordinated Interaction: Pre-Merger constraints and Post-Merger Effects, 12(1) GEO.
MASON L. REV. 65, 71 (2003) [hereinafter “Dick”].
2. FTC v. PPG Indus., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
3. Id. 72-9.
4. J. E. HARRINGTON, JR., THE COLLUSION CHASM: REDUCING THE GAP BETWEEN ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND INDUSTRIAL ORGA-
NIZATIONAL THEORY, Slide 7, Csef-Iger Symposium on Economics and Institutions, [hereinafter
“Harrington”] available at http://www.econ.jhu.edu/People/Harrington/Capri.ppt.
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tutes?” Do firms only look to form cartels when the legally safer option of tacit
collusion is unattainable? Is cartel formation sometimes provoked by a break-
down in tacit collusion? And once a cartel is busted, should we suppose that sub-
sequent behavior will approximate ‘competition’, or is some sort of tacitly collu-
sive equilibrium a more sensible counterfactual?
For the purpose of this paper, we will define ‘market structure’ very narrowly
by the number of firms in the market and the asymmetries among them.
Asymmetries will be defined in terms of market shares—we are concerned with
looking for stylized facts applicable across markets—but we should stress that
these merely serve as a reduced form indicator of what really matters, i.e. the
underlying causes of those asymmetries (see the
next section). This is a limitation on our analy-
sis which we freely acknowledge.
Precisely because tacit collusion is difficult to
identify and measure in practice, our research
strategy is almost inevitably indirect. We begin
in section 4 by recounting our recent study of
the merger control case decisions by a
Competition Authority (“CA”), the European Commission, in which tacit col-
lusion (coordinated effects) appears to have been an issue. We argue that this is
probably the only way of assembling a fairly large body of cases, equivalent to
existing databases on cartels. Although actual tacit collusion is generally not ille-
gal (hence the absence of actual cases), merger control is one area of policy
where CAs are obliged to assess the prospects that tacit collusion may arise. In
most major jurisdictions, there is a reasonably large number of such cases, pro-
viding the scope for constructing a database sufficiently large to support econo-
metric analysis designed to uncover stylized facts about the sorts of market struc-
tures that are associated with tacit collusion—at least as seen through the eyes of
the CA. From a European perspective, this is not without interest given the con-
troversies of recent years concerning the Commission’s decisions in celebrated
cases such as Airtours (1999)5, the academic critique of the Nestle-Perrier case6
and the 2004 revision to the European Merger Regulation.
Having approached tacit collusion indirectly from this perspective, in section
5 we turn to a sometimes neglected (at least in the mainstream) academic liter-
ature: experimental work on tacit collusion. Again, given the obvious difficulties
in simulating real world markets in a sterile laboratory environment, empirical
experimental research should only be viewed as an indirect source of facts.
However, given the difficulties in applying more traditional econometric field
Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?
5. M.1424 Airtours/First Choice (1999).
6. O. Compte, F. Jenny, & P. Rey, Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion, EUR.ECON REV, 46(1), 1-29
(2002) [hereinafter “Compte, et al”].
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analysis, we suggest that experiments, like coordinated effects merger cases, can
offer important insights into the subject. In section 6, we move on to more famil-
iar literature on the characteristics of prosecuted cartels. Here, the facts on firm
numbers are already reasonably well documented, but we add some new findings
on asymmetries which are emerging from our own ongoing research on the struc-
ture of a sample of EC cartels.
These three disparate sources offer some thought provoking contrasts: while
‘tacit collusion’ is typically found in only symmetric duopolies, cartels are usual-
ly characterized by more (sometimes far more) than just two players, and often
display very pronounced asymmetries in the members’ market shares. Section 7
speculates on some of the implications for future research in all three areas: merg-
er analysis, experimental research, and cartels.
The next two sections first provide some preliminaries. Section 2 briefly sur-
veys the standard theoretical expectations on collusion and market structure.
Section 3 introduces a simple geometric device, which we employ throughout
the article to aid exposition.
II. Terminology and the Standard Economists’
Model of Collusion
At the outset, we should be clear on terminology. Motta7 provides a very clear dis-
cussion of the economist’s distinction between cartels and tacit collusion, which
captures what we take to be the prevailing view—it is certainly ours. While col-
lusion might be defined in economic theory as
any market outcome in which prices are high
(relative to those in the one-shot non-coopera-
tive equilibrium), collusion should only be con-
sidered illegal (i.e. equivalent to a cartel) where
firms explicitly coordinate their actions. Where
there is no explicit coordination, collusion is
tacit and not illegal by default definition. The
term ‘tacit collusion’ is perhaps a little inappropriate—‘tacit coordination’ might
be less open to misunderstanding—but common practice dictates that we retain
‘tacit collusion’ here. Of course, in particular cases, there will be debate about cer-
tain practices—are they explicit or tacit coordination—but that is not the subject
of this paper8.
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7. M. MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, Ch. 4, (2004).
8. For a discussion of this issue, see M. MOTTA, CARTELS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ECONOMICS, LAW, PRACTICE,
paper written for Fifty years of the Treaty: Assessment and Perspectives of Competition Policy in
Europe Conference, IESE Business School (2007).
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Vol. 4, No. 2, Autumn 2008 179
Thus tacit collusion need not, and generally will not, entail explicitly agreed
strategies or information exchange, and the spirit of what we have in mind is still
captured perfectly by Chamberlin’s (oft-quoted, by amongst others, Tirole9)
words of 75 years ago:
“If each (firm) seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, he will
realise that when there are only 2 sellers, his own move has a considerable
effect upon his competitors, and that it makes it idle to suppose that they will
accept without retaliation the losses he forces upon them. Since the result of
a cut by any one is inevitably to decrease his own profit, no one will cut, and
although the sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the
same as though there were a monopolistic agreement between them.”10
This anticipates, and fits comfortably with, the contemporary interpretation of
tacit collusion as a potential equilibrium outcome from a dynamic non-coopera-
tive game. That model is routinely recited in all self-respecting industrial organ-
ization textbooks, and is rigorously and concisely summarized by Ivaldi et al11,
writing for the European Commission.
Starting from the base case of an homogenous product symmetric duopoly with
Nash reversion, Ivaldi et al derive a series of standard results on the market con-
ditions under which tacit collusion is likely, including: transparent prices, fre-
quent interaction, absence of barriers, and buyer power; but here we are most
concerned with firm numbers and asymmetries. They show that the critical
threshold for the discount factor increases (and collusion becomes less likely) as
the number of firms increases. The intuition is that, with more firms, each firm
gets a lower share of the pie from colluding, thus increasing the gains from cheat-
ing as well as reducing the attractiveness of long-term collusion. A second factor
working in the same direction, but not covered in this model, is that the likeli-
hood that firms are able to tacitly coordinate on a price is reduced the greater the
number of firms involved. Turning to market share asymmetries, they show how
collusion is most likely with perfect symmetry, but becomes increasingly less like-
ly as the two firms’ shares diverge. The intuition here is that a smaller market
Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?
9. J. TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 240 (1988).
10. E. H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, 48 (1933).
11. M. IVALDI, P. REY, P. SEABRIGHT, & J. TIROLE, THE ECONOMICS OF TACIT COLLUSION, (report for DG Comp, European
Commission, 2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/studies_reports/
the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf.
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share reduces the profitability of sticking to the collusive price. However, there
is an important caveat on asymmetries—as Ivaldi et al note, market shares are
endogenous, and what really matters are the causes of the asymmetry. For exam-
ple, if the asymmetry derives from a fundamental asymmetry between the firms
in costs, then the high cost (low share) firm has more to gain from undercutting
and less to fear from retaliation.
In recent years, the theoretical literature has explored various possibilities on
the causes of asymmetry: Rothschild12 on costs, Compte, et al13 on capacity,
Kühn14 on the number of products, and Vasconcelos15 on capacity/costs. Although
the details of these models vary, the underlying mechanism always works through
the asymmetry this causes in the firms’ incentives to collude/punish/deviate.
Although the general message that emerges from this literature is that asym-
metries reduce the likelihood of collusion, it is clear that any rigorous test of the
theory should seek to identify the causes of asymmetry in particular markets. In
the current paper, however, because we are more concerned with general stylized
facts that might apply across industries, we are
almost inevitably reliant on using observed mar-
ket shares to deduce the degree of asymmetry.
Finally, it should be stressed that models with-
in this genre are presented as models of tacit col-
lusion. However, as hinted earlier, it is not
uncommon to use the same model to derive pre-
dictions and explanations relating more to car-
tels. Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples,
even in the best textbooks and articles, where
the authors(s) appear to use the terms cartels and tacitly collusive groups inter-
changeably. This might be explained simply by rather sloppy use of language, but
one might also argue, along with Martin,16 that there is a fundamental discon-
nect between treating collusion as an outcome of a noncooperative game and the
antitrust concept of collusion.
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12. R. ROTHSCHILD, Cartel Stability When Costs are Heterogeneous, INT’L J. INDUS.ORG., 17, 717-734 (1999).
13. Compte, et al supra note 6.
14. K.U. KÜHN, THE CO-ORDINATED EFFECTS OF MERGERS IN DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MARKETS (University of
Michigan, Legal Working Paper Series 34, 2004).
15. H. VASCONCELOS, Tacit Collusion Cost Asymmetries and Mergers, 36 (1) RAND J. ECON. 39-62 (2005).
16. S. MARTIN, Competition Policy, Collusion and Tacit Collusion, INT’L J. INDUS.ORG, 24, 1299-1301 (2006).
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III. Depicting Market Structure: The Oligopoly
Triangle
The exposition of the remainder of this paper is considerably eased by introduc-
ing the following graphical device as a way of summarizing and comparing mar-
ket structures. For a given market in which there are N firms, this entails plot-
ting the market share of the number one ranked firm against that of the number
two ranked firm, as in figure 1. We explain the interpretation of this diagram first
where N≤3, and then for N>3.
A. LITERAL TRIOPOLY
In a market with N=3, with firms ranked by the size of their market shares, S1,
S2 and S3, the point (S2, S1) must provide a complete characterisation of the
structure of that market.
As shown in Box 1, by construction, the point (S2, S1) must lie within the A
triangle, with the three corners identifying the three limiting market structures:
perfect monopoly (MON), symmetric duopoly (DUO), and symmetric triopoly
(TRI). Outside these extremes, location within the triangle represents: (i) the
level of concentration (if measured by S1+S2, this is higher for points closer to
the downward sloping diagonal (S1=100-S2)), (ii) the degree of size symmetry
between S1 and S2 (the distance from the upward sloping diagonal, S1=S2, here-
after referred to as the symmetry diagonal), and (iii) the degree of size asymme-
try between S2 and S3 (distance along the symmetry diagonal).
Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?
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B. WITH MORE THAN THREE FIRMS
Interpretation of the triangle becomes less clear-cut when there are other firms
in the market, but it remains true that the location of any point reveals both the
level of two-firm concentration (S1+S2) and the degree of asymmetry between
S1 and S2. Although there is now an indeterminacy on the relative sizes of S3
and all other smaller firms, we can add some further insights by inserting two
additional lines to the diagram (figure 2).
Denoting the combined market shares of all other smaller ‘fringe’ firms by F,
then the point will only remain within the original A triangle if S2≥ F+S317.
Hereafter, we refer to this as the ‘literal triopoly’ triangle: a sufficient, but not
necessary, condition for location within A is that the market is a literal tri-
opoly—other structures, with relatively small fringes (in the above sense) will
also be located within A.
Second, for all other points lying below A, there must be a non-empty fringe
F which is reasonably large. In general, as F becomes larger, we will tend to move
towards the origin. In fact, we can be a little more precise. As proved in Box 2,
all points in the D area close to the origin refer to markets where F is ‘very large’
in the sense that F≥S1; while all points in the C area refer to markets where F at
least exceeds the size of S2. Note, however, that both statements refer to suffi-
cient conditions, meaning that we can not exclude the possibility of F>S1 even
Stephen Davies and Matthew Olczak
17. Proof: since S1+S2+S3+F=100, then S1≥100–S2 requires that 100–S2–S3–F≥100–2S2, i.e. S2≥F+S3.
Box 1
Proof that (S , S ) lies in the A triangle, with corners,
MON- DUO-TRI
Given that
(i) ﬁrms are ranked by size, S≥ S , and the point
must therefore lie on or above the symmetry
diagonal, S=S
(i) the sum of shares can not exceed 100% ,
S+S≤100, so the point can not lie outside the
downward sloping diagonal, S=100-S
(i) ﬁrms are ranked by size, S≥S3. Thus, by trivial
manipulation, S≥100–S-S, i.e. S≥100–2S. So the
point must lie no lower than the line S=100–2S.
Box 1
Box 2
Proof that triangles C and D denote
approximate magnitudes of the fringe, F
Given that S+S+S+F=100,
(i) if F≥S, then 100-S-S-S≥S, and, since S≥S,
suﬃcient condition for this is 100-2S-2S≥0 or
50-S≥S1, i.e. in area D
(i) if F≥S, then 100-S-S-S≥S, and, since S≥S,
suﬃcient condition for this is 100-S-3S≥0 or
100-3S≥S, i.e. in areas C and D
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in C or F>S2 even in B—it depends also on the size of F relative to S3. For the
same reason, the interpretation of area B is even more indeterminate, although,
in general, it is likely that only markets with relatively small F will qualify for
inclusion in B.
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In summary then, we suggest that this ‘oligopoly triangle’ provides a useful
first-blush way of summarizing and comparing market structures between
antitrust cases. The rest of this article puts the triangle through its paces in three
applications, each designed to explore the conditions under which collusion
might occur. In each case, closeness to the symmetry diagonal will reveal the
degree of symmetry between the two largest players and distance from the origin
will give a guide to the size of the fringe, with a ranking of the areas D>C>B>A
denoting descending order of the minimum size of F.
IV. An Analysis of Coordinated Effects Mergers
as an Indirect Strategy for Observing Tacit
Collusion
As explained in the introduction, the purpose of Davies, et al18 was to explore
the conditions under which tacit collusion might arise by looking through the
eyes of an antitrust authority (in this case the
European Commission) in the one area of policy
where its decisions reveal its views on tacit col-
lusion, namely those mergers which (may) have
coordinated effects (collective dominance).
Throughout, we use the terms ‘collective domi-
nance’ and ‘coordinated effects’19 synonymous-
ly—both refer to mergers where it is anticipated
that the firms remaining in the market post-
merger (including the merged firm) would be
likely to coordinate their actions. Clearly, no
CA could ever allege that such coordination
would amount to overt collusion—to block a
merger on such an interpretation would be tantamount to asserting that firms
would act illegally, post-merger! Rather, we take it as given that coordination in
this context can only refer to ‘tacit collusion’.
At the heart of Davies, et al’s paper is a very simple model of decision making
by a CA. It assumes that, when deciding whether a given merger should be
allowed to proceed or require remedies or prohibition, the CA considers all mar-
kets in which there are overlaps between the merging parties. For each market,
Stephen Davies and Matthew Olczak
18. S.W. DAVIES, M. OLCZAK, & H. COLES, TACIT COLLUSION, FIRM ASYMMETRIES AND NUMBERS: EVIDENCE FROM EC
MERGER CASES (CCP, Working Paper No. 07, 7, 2008) [hereinafter “Davies et al, 2008”].
19. We employ the European terminology, Collective Dominance, merely because our data derive from
European cases over the period when this was the European Commission’s common parlance for
coordinated effects. Since the revision to the merger regulation in 2004, ‘coordinated effects’ has
become common terminology, even within Europe.
CLEARLY, NO CA COULD
EVER ALLEGE THAT SUCH
COORDINATION WOULD AMOUNT
TO OVERT COLLUSION—TO BLOCK
A MERGER ON SUCH AN
INTERPRETATION WOULD BE
TANTAMOUNT TO ASSERTING
THAT FIRMS WOULD ACT
ILLEGALLY, POST-MERGER!
Vol. 4, No. 2, Autumn 2008 185
it chooses between nonintervention and declaring a theory of harm, and, if the
latter, whether it is single or collective dominance (unilateral or coordinated
effects). In coming to its decisions, the CA follows its own merger guidelines20
and therefore takes into account: (i) the potential market shares and asymme-
tries of the leading players post-merger;21 and (ii) a checklist of other market con-
ditions, including barriers to entry, buyer power, spare capacity, and transparent
prices —these are referred to as the X conditions. The CA is then assumed to
employ a structural model (more precisely, a model of the structure of market
shares) to decide between theories of harm, but this only comes into play if the
checklist of X conditions is satisfied (e.g. high barriers, no buyer power).
Although simple, this model faces a key empirical problem which must be solved
if it is to be estimated on a sample of real world mergers. The checklist of mar-
ket characteristics not only lists the status of near-necessary conditions but these
characteristics are also difficult for the researcher to measure, or even proxy, in
an objective manner. As explained presently, our solution is to identify the sub-
set of mergers for which the X conditions are likely to be satisfied, and then esti-
mate the structural model only for that subset.
A. THE SAMPLE MERGERS
In order to test this model, we assembled a sample of mergers for which there are
good reasons to suppose that the Commission seriously contemplated collective
dominance as a potential consequence of the merger. (In general, we can assume
that single dominance is always contemplated in principle.) We drew from the
full population of over 2,400 merger reports published by the Commission, 1990-
2004. This is the period from the introduction of the European Merger
Regulation (“ECMR”) in 199022 up to its revision in 2004. We ended the period
at 2004 in order to avoid potential complications from any structural break at the
time of the revision.
Within the full population, all merger reports were word-searched for the use
of one or more of the following phrases: collective dominance, (tacit) collusion, joint
dominance, oligopolistic dominance, or coordinated effects. This identified 94 candi-
date mergers, but closer textual examination revealed that in 32 of these the
above phrases were only used in a cursory manner—typically in a throwaway sin-
Tacit versus Overt Collusion Firm Asymmetries and Numbers: What’s the Evidence?
20. See http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm for the U.S. guidelines, and http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_031/c_03120040205en00050018.pdf for the EU guidelines.
21. We follow the convention of all CAs by ‘estimating’ the hypothetical post-merger market share of the
merging firms by simply adding their pre-merger shares.
22. These are all mergers with a European, as opposed to purely national, dimension, and which exceed
specified turnover thresholds. See S.W. DAVIES & B.R. LYONS, MERGERS AND MERGER REMEDIES IN THE EU:
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPETITION (Edward Elgar, 2007) and S.W. DAVIES & M. OLCZAK, ASSESSING
THE EFFICACY OF STRUCTURAL MERGER REMEDIES: CHOOSING BETWEEN THEORIES OF HARM? (CCP,Working Paper No.
08, 28, 2008) [hereinafter “Davies and Olczak 2008”] for more discussion of the ECMR and remedies.
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gle sentence or short paragraph, revealing that the Commission had easily dis-
missed the possibility. This leaves 62 mergers in which the text of the
Commission’s report includes a non-trivial discussion of the possibility that the
merger might lead to collective dominance in at least one of the markets
involved in the merger. It should be stressed that this search process merely iden-
tified all mergers in which collective dominance was seriously considered as a
potential problem in at least one market. As will be seen, in by no means all cases
did the Commission eventually judge that the merger would lead to collective
dominance.
Four key descriptive facts on this sample help set the scene:
1. Collective dominance evidently arises as an issue only very infre-
quently; in no year during this period does this sample account for
more than 4 percent of the total of all mergers.23
2. Since we confine our attention to only those cases where there are
market overlaps between the merging firms, all mergers were purely
horizontal.
3. Nearly all of these mergers are multi-market, involving more than just
one product market and, remembering the EU context, more than just
one Member State. In total, the 62 mergers covered 456 different mar-
kets in which there were overlaps between the merging parties and for
which there is useable data. Thus, the average merger covers seven
different markets, but with a skewed distribution around the average.
However, in nearly all mergers, the different markets covered are very
closely related in product space. This is either because the merger
relates to the same product market in different countries and/or even
when there is more than one product market, they are closely related.
In 54 of the mergers, all markets covered belonged to the same 4-digit
industry, and seven involved only two 4-digit industries. (This
becomes important below for our assumption of X-homogeneity.)
4. Post-merger, most markets have no more than two or (much less fre-
quently) three major players. As an illustration, defining a ‘significant’
market share as more than 15 percent, then the sample includes:
just one market in which there are five significant players; 12
quadropolies; 89 triopolies; 245 duopolies; and 97 monopolies. Of
course, 15 percent is an arbitrary yardstick, but any plausible alterna-
tives yield qualitatively similar conclusions.
Stephen Davies and Matthew Olczak
23. From figures reported by M. Bergman, M. B. Coate, M. Jakobsson, & S.W. Ulrick in Comparing Merger
Policies: The European Union Versus the United States (2007) (working paper on file with the authors),
it would appear that coordinated effects is considered far more frequently as an issue by the FTC in
the United States. Dick (supra note 1) reports that, between 1999-2003, the FTC successfully chal-
lenged 11 proposed mergers under a coordinated effects theory.
Vol. 4, No. 2, Autumn 2008 187
B. EC’S DECISIONS FITTED TO THE OLIGOPOLY TRIANGLE
The EC actually intervened in only 25 of these mergers: the merger was prohib-
ited in four cases and allowed to proceed in 21 cases (subject to remedies in one
or more markets). We argue that it is only in this sub-sample of mergers—where
an intervention occurred in one or more markets—that it is possible to isolate
the structural model of single and collective dominance by controlling for other
important market characteristics (including barriers to entry, absence of buyer
power, and price transparency) that are embodied in the necessary X conditions.
This argument relies on an assumption referred to as X-homogeneity; all markets
covered by a given merger are assumed to share the same X market characteris-
tics. For example, if the market for large tin cans is characterized by high entry
barriers in Germany, the same is likely to be true for small tin cans, as well as for
tin cans in France. If this assumption holds, then the decision to intervene in
some markets in a particular merger implies that the necessary X conditions have
been satisfied—not only for those markets, but also for all other markets covered
by the same merger. It then follows that intervention in some markets, but not
others, can be explained by structural conditions rather than by X market char-
acteristics. Of course, this can only be an approximation to reality, but Davies, et
al24 present detailed discussion and empirical evidence in support.
For this reason, we include only these 25 mergers, covering 222 different mar-
kets, for an in-depth empirical analysis of the EC’s decisions: 29 involved inter-
vention for collective dominance (“CD”), 89 for single dominance (“SD”)25,
while in the remaining 104 no intervention was deemed necessary. Note then
that, in each of these mergers, the Commission reveals that it has considered the
possibilities of both SD and CD—typically for different markets in the same
merger—and that it is common to find, for a given merger, noninterventions and
interventions, as well as different types of interventions across markets.
Figure 3 plots the potential post-merger structures, differentiated by decisions,
within the oligopoly triangle. In figure 3(a), for the sake of clarity, the scatters
are not shown but represented using head counts of the number of interventions
relative to the total number of markets in each of the four areas. The probabili-
ty of intervention is highest (nearly three-quarters) in the literal triopoly area A,
and very low in the large-fringe area D (only 8 percent). The intervention rate
is now less than one per cent.
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24. Davies et al 2008, supra note 18 at 36-8.
25. The collective dominance decisions also include 15 markets in which a group of firms were ‘structural-
ly linked’ in some way (usually shareholdings). In these cases the EC essentially views these firms as a
single entity, and we combine the shares of the linked firms and count them as SD decisions.
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Figure 3(b) shows the full scatter of points, but for the intervention markets
only (i.e. now excluding markets without intervention). This clearly demon-
strates that CD only occurs within a narrow band just above the symmetry diag-
onal. It is most common in A, and to a lesser extent B, but extremely rare oth-
erwise. It appears the European Commission requires, as a necessary condition
for collective dominance, that the joint share of the two largest firms be high and
that their shares be fairly symmetric. On the other hand, single dominance deci-
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sions occur with greater incidence in all areas except D, and typically with pro-
nounced asymmetry between S1 and S2, especially in area A.
C. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In Davies et al, this is formalized using a multinomial logit econometric estima-
tor, in which there are three outcomes (NI, SD, and CD) and there are two sim-
ple market share explanatory variables—the sum and ratio of the market shares
of the two largest firms: SUM (S1+S2) and RATIO (S2/S1). These two variables
are both strongly significant at the 99 percent level in both the equations for SD
and CD. They also have the expected signs, indicating that interventions are
more likely in concentrated markets (high SUM) and, for CD, in symmetric
markets (high RATIO) but for SD in asymmetric markets (low RATIO). The
model successfully explains 79 percent of all 222 decisions. Figure 4 displays the
predicted decisions graphically, and Table 1 shows the different possible out-
comes implied, depending upon the size of the number one and two ranked firms.
Thus, when the number one ranked firm has a very large post-merger market
share (>65 percent), the model predicts that the Commission will always decide
SD. However, at lower values for S1, the decision also depends crucially on the
size of S2 post-merger. For example, at S1=55 percent, while the Commission
will always judge the structure to entail dominance, this will be single dominance
if S2 is relatively small, but collective dominance if S2 is relatively large. Perhaps
most interesting is where S1=45 percent—here all three outcomes can occur,
depending on S2: where S2 is ‘large’, the EC opts for a CD decision, where S2 is
‘small’, it opts for SD, but for intermediate S2, it opts for NI. This implies that
there are some cases where the number two firm is considered to be sufficiently
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large to counteract the otherwise dominant position of the leader, but not suffi-
ciently large to result in collective dominance (i.e. the resulting size asymmetry
rules out tacit collusion.)
As a short policy postscript, we can report how things have changed beyond the
above time period. After the Commission revised its Merger Regulation in May
2004 (up to mid 2007), there were 13 mergers which satisfy our criteria for inclu-
sion in the above sample: non-trivial discussion of coordinated effects (which has
now displaced collective dominance as preferred terminology) and a remedy
imposed in one or more markets. Strikingly, of the 274 markets covered by these
mergers, in only two has the Commission justified an intervention citing the pos-
sibility of coordinated effects.26 Thus, while the proportion of all mergers match-
ing the criteria for inclusion remains in the region of two percent, indicating an
unchanged willingness to contemplate and discuss coordinated effects, the prob-
ability that the judgment will actually invoke coordinated markets in any market
is now less than one percent.
Moreover, even in these two cases, the decisions are equivocal:
“The Commission does not rule out the possibility that the merger, besides
producing non-coordinated effects . . . may also lead to a weakening of com-
petitive pressure as a result of coordinated effects”27
and
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26. In five others, it intervened on the basis of structural links—a not dissimilar proportion to that found
pre-2004.
27. Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.3916, T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring, (Apr. 26, 2006) para 127.
Table 1 Possible Outcomes at Different Sizes for S1 and S2
Different outcomes according to size of S2
S1 (%) NI CD SD
45 18<S2<35 35<S2 S2<18
55 37<S2 S2<37
65 For all S2
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“The [merger] would with high probability lead to non-coordinated effects
. . . [and] the Commission has serious doubts that [it] may even lead to . . .
coordinated effects”28
In other words, not only is the Commission
now wary of invoking coordinated effects, but
also, rather strangely and in stark contrast to
its practice up to 2004, it couples coordinated
effects with unilateral effects. One might
interpret this either as a reluctance to come off
the fence, or as a belief that both effects might
occur simultaneously. The post 2004 period is
the subject of our ongoing research.29
V. Experimental Literature
A cynic, when faced with the above results and asked “How have they advanced
the understanding of tacit collusion and collusion in general?” might quite justi-
fiably respond: “Nothing, unless one can trust in the ability of a CA to correct-
ly identify such markets.” But putting aside disbelief for the sake of the argument,
our results on firm numbers and size asymmetries provide some intriguing paral-
lels and contrasts with findings from the adjacent experimental and cartel liter-
atures. We first consider the experimental literature, and here a consensus
appears to be emerging.
The generic advantage of experimental as compared to real-world, fieldwork-
based econometric, empirical work is that one can control for potentially con-
founding factors. In the context of mergers, for example, Fonseca and Normann30
suggest that “economic conditions, cost gains derived from the merger, barriers
to entry or industry maturity” might all obscure any underlying “strategic effects
of mergers on pricing behaviour.” In the context of tacit collusion, this advan-
tage is arguably even more pronounced given the difficulties in unambiguously
identifying tacit collusion in real world settings. For the experimenter, this prob-
lem is side-stepped by defining a tacitly collusive outcome as any in which
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28. Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.4141, Linde/BOC (June 6, 2006), para 179-180.
29. Davies, et al 2008, supra note 18.
30. M. A. FONSECA & H. T. NORMANN, Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion: Experimental Evidence, 118
ECON. J. 387- 400 (2008) [hereinafter “Fonseca”].
IN OTHER WORDS, NOT ONLY IS
THE COMMISSION NOW WARY OF
INVOKING COORDINATED EFFECTS,
BUT ALSO, RATHER STRANGELY
AND IN STARK CONTRAST TO
ITS PRACTICE UP TO 2004, IT
COUPLES COORDINATED EFFECTS
WITH UNILATERAL EFFECTS.
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“prices [are] above Nash prices”31, where the former are experimentally observed
and the latter set by the conditions of the experiment.
To date, experimentalists have devoted far more attention to firm numbers
than to asymmetries. Huck et al conducted a meta analysis on 19 previous stud-
ies, 1963-2003, which used Cournot experiments. (See also Engel32 for a wider,
but more loosely focused meta analysis). These studies involved between two and
five symmetric firms and satisfied certain requisites including: no communica-
tion among participants, fixed groups interacting repeatedly, homogeneous prod-
ucts, and usually linear demand and costs. Measuring collusion (inversely) by the
ratio of the experimental ‘industry’ output to the analytical Cournot-Nash out-
come, they found a statistically significant (at a five percent level) inverse cor-
relation between firm numbers and collusion. However, on average, it is only in
two-firm markets that actual output is less than the Cournot level, leading to
their headline finding: “Collusion sometimes occurs in duopolies (but) is very
rare in markets with more than two firms.”33
Huck, et al also conduct some experiments of their own, within a more unified
framework than is possible in a meta analysis. These corroborate the meta analy-
sis—collusion sometimes occurs when there are only two firms, but never in mar-
kets with four or more. Even in three firm markets, the average outcome is close
to the Nash equilibrium. Thus, their message is clearly captured by their title:
“Two are few and four are many.”34 This title is clearly a deliberate implicit refer-
ence to Selten’s seminal argument that “four are few and six are many.”
(Although he coined this in a slightly different context, Selten’s paper appears
to have been a major stimulus to much of the experimental literature.)
The experimental literature on asymmetries is much thinner. Huck, et al
report only two in the Cournot setting, the most relevant for current purposes
being Mason, et al.35 In their experiments, outputs were found to be significant-
ly higher (and thus prices lower) where firms have asymmetric, rather than sym-
metric, costs. Their explanation appeals to the greater difficulties in coordina-
tion where firms are dissimilar.
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31. S. HUCK, H. T. NORMANN, & J. OECHSSLER, Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in
Experimental Oligopolies, 53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 436, fn.4 (2004) [hereinafter “Huck”].
32. C. ENGEL, HOW MUCH COLLUSION? A Meta-Analysis on Oligopoly Experiments, 3/4 J. COMPETITION L. ECON.
491-549 (2007).
33. Huck supra note 31 at 440.
34. See R. SELTEN, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many, 2
INT’L J. GAME THEORY 141-201 (1973).
35. C. F. MASON, O. R. PHILLIPS, & C. NOWELL, Duopoly Behaviour in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental
Evaluation, 74 REV. ECON. & STAT. 662-670 (1992).
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More recently, asymmetries have been explored by Fonseca and Normann36 in
an experimental setting which closely follows the Bertrand-Edgeworth model
employed in Compte, et al37, referred to in section 2. Here, firms set prices (as
opposed to setting quantity in Cournot) but subject to potential capacity con-
straints. The range of alternative market structures considered is admittedly lim-
ited, either just two or three firms, and in each case with either symmetric or
asymmetric capacities, but this allows for easy interpretation in terms of our oli-
gopoly triangle (figure 5).
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36. Fonseca supra note 30.
37. Compte, et al, supra note 6.
Table 2 Alternative Market Structures in Fonseca and Normann’s Experiments
Firm Capacities
Structure S1 S2 S3
A 3 Symmetric 134 134 134
B 2 Asymmetric 160 134 108
C 2 Symmetric 201 201
D 2 Asymmetric 268 134
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D
Figure 5
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Their experiments are repeated, with fixed groups, over 30 period sessions,
thereafter subject to random stopping. In all cases, demand and total capacity are
identical. Prices are only compared from period 11 onwards, to allow for learn-
ing effects within a repeated game. They report the following ranked weighted
mean prices across the four treatments:
p
C
 p
D
 p
A
 p
B
In other words, price is highest with two equal sized firms (C) and lowest with
three unequal sized firms (B). These results are consistent with what we might
loosely refer to as the ‘standard’ predictions on the likelihood of collusion. Thus,
• Reductions in firm numbers lead to increased prices, both in the sym-
metric and asymmetric cases, i.e. p
C
 p
A
and p
D
 p
B
• Asymmetry leads to reduced prices, holding numbers constant at
either 2 or 3, i.e. p
C
 p
D
and p
A
 p
B
As it happens, this ranking is not quite as predicted by the very specific model
of Compte et al38, and that should be the subject of future research. But this need
not distract us here from the key conclusion for our purposes—asymmetry
appears to have a definite collusion-dampening role, even where there are just
two or three firms.
Of course, as is true for any area of economics, the experimental methodology
is not without its limitations. In the current context, it can be argued that it is
very difficult to emulate the real world conditions under which tacit collusion
can occur with experimental subjects who are often largely inexperienced (in
Fonseca and Normann, students from the home university). Thus we should be
extremely wary in concluding that tacit collusion in the real world is unlikely
with more than two players, and/or with asymmetries. Arguably, real world fac-
tors, such as mutual trust and familiarity, fostered over quite long periods of time,
are at the heart of tacit collusion. But these factors are very difficult to simulate
in a laboratory environment, especially with the fairly trivial prizes given even
in the best-funded laboratory. While it is true that the experiments reported
above were repeated over many simulated time periods (allowing for learning)
with subjects not randomly matched (typically cooperation is never observed
experimentally with random matching), a future research agenda must surely
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38. In Compte, et al, the one shot equilibrium would imply, alternatively, p
D
 p
C
 p
B
 p
A
, because the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium average price is decreasing in the capacity of the smaller firms. This
is because, with greater capacity for the smaller firms, the largest firm is more likely to opt for a lower
price. On the other hand, in their collusive equilibrium, the critical discount rate increases with the
capacity share of the largest firm. If this translates into a lower collusive price, then this predicts:
p
A
 p
B
 p
C
 p
D
. The intuition here is that because the larger is the capacity share of the largest
firm, the less severe is the punishment, which makes collusion harder to sustain.
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include a deeper investigation of communication among participants39.
Certainly, we know from other areas of experimental work that the probability
of cooperative outcomes increases rapidly as greater communication is allowed
(Huck, et al40). Just how much communication, and of what type, is contentious,
but this is at the heart of the antitrust debate
about what constitutes proof of overt, as
opposed to tacit, collusion.
VI. Cartels
Unsurprisingly, the empirical literature on car-
tels is far more extensive than that on tacit col-
lusion since cartel cases are unambiguous and often publicly documented by
competition agencies and others. However, caution is needed here, too, because
we only observe detected cartels, and sample selection bias can not be ruled out
with respect to market structures. Nevertheless, this literature tells a very differ-
ent story from that of the two previous sections.
First, on firm numbers in general, the evidence may suggest that “cartels are
more likely if concentration is large and/or there are relatively few firms in the
market/industry” (Grout and Sondregger).41 However, exceptions are sufficiently
frequent for Levenstein and Suslow42 to refer to “the lack of a clear empirical rela-
tionship.” They offer as possible explanations: sample selection bias (detected car-
tels may not be a random sample of the population), the potential for a counter-
acting reverse causality (the softer competition implied by cartels may allow more
firms to survive), and, most tellingly for present purposes, the possibility that
small numbers markets may be able to tacitly collude as an alternative to cartel
formation. A rough indication of the typical number of firms involved in some of
the most prominent existing studies of cartel studies is shown by Table 3.43
Second, rather surprisingly, the empirical cartel literature appears to have paid
much less systematic attention to asymmetries. However, a casual reading of CA
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39. A related experimental literature is already emerging which contemplates the possibility of partici-
pants switching from overt to tacit collusion in the face of a leniency program, see for example J.
Hinloopen & A. Soetevent, From Overt to Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence on the Adverse Effects
of Corporate Leniency Programs (2008) (mimeo available at the University of Amsterdam).
40. Huck supra note 31, at 438 Summary 1.
41. P. Grout & S. Sonderegger, Predicting Cartels (Office of Fair Trading, Economic Discussion Paper
OFT773, 15, 2005) [hereinafter “Grout”] available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/
comp_policy/oft773.pdf.
42. M.C. LEVENSTEIN & V.Y. SUSLOW, What Determines Cartel Success?, XLIV J. ECON. LITERATURE 58 (2006).
43. Derived from Id., Tables 4 and 5. De’s database is referred to in the text.
JUST HOW MUCH COMMUNICATION,
AND OF WHAT TYPE, IS CONTENTIOUS,
BUT THIS IS AT THE HEART OF THE
ANTITRUST DEBATE ABOUT WHAT
CONSTITUTES PROOF OF OVERT, AS
OPPOSED TO TACIT, COLLUSION.
Competition Policy International196
reports on real world cartels suggests that size asymmetries among cartel members
can sometimes be quite pronounced. From their sample of 24 EC case studies,
Grout and Sondregger44 suggest that “we clearly observe a considerable hetero-
geneity in the market shares held by cartel members,” citing four examples in
particular: Citric Acid, Methionine, Far Eastern Trade Tariff and Surcharge
Agreement (EC), and Ferry Operators-Currency Surcharges.
Some of our own ongoing work in progress45 provides a useful overview on
both firm numbers and asymmetries. The database relates to the 41 successfully
prosecuted EC cartels, 1990-2006, for which it has been possible to extract the
required data on market shares, and excludes all cases involving associations of
firms. As can be seen from the last column of Table 3, the median number of
firms in this sample was 5 and the mean 6. Both are slightly lower than the com-
parable statistics from the previous studies shown in the table, but nevertheless
confirm that cartels typically entail larger firm numbers than in either our own
work on mergers or in the experimental litera-
ture: only eight cartels involved just two firms,
three involved three, 22 involved four to seven
firms, and 12 involved eight or more firms.
However, our findings on the extent of size
asymmetries within this sample are more intrigu-
ing. Again, the oligopoly triangle (figures 6) provides a useful quick guide, with
the axes, as before, depicting the relative sizes of the two largest players within
each cartel. Here, it is important to stress that, for this purpose, we show market
shares as percentages of the total size (typically sales) of the cartel. To the extent
that cartel members do not account for the entire market, this overstates firms’
market shares. In this sample, the median cartel accounts for about 90 percent of
the market, but in some cases it is much lower: coverage is less than 70 percent
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44. Grout supra note 41.
45. This is in collaboration with Oindrila De, who has been responsible for the careful reading of the
large number of EC case documents necessary to generate the estimates drawn on here.
Table 3 Number of participants in Cartels
Numbers Hay & Fraas & Levenstein DeKelley Greer Posner & Suslow (EC Cartels)
Mean 7.25 16.7 29.1 6.1
Median 7 8 6 to 10 8 5
Fewer than 10 79% 60% 64% 63% 85%
HOWEVER, OUR FINDINGS
ON THE EXTENT OF SIZE
ASYMMETRIES WITHIN THIS
SAMPLE ARE MORE INTRIGUING.
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in seven cases. Obviously, if expressed as genuine market shares, a number of the
observations would be moved closer to the origin.
For simplicity and comparability with the earlier figure (3a), figure 6(a) first
merely reports the counts across the four areas of the diagram. This is in marked
contrast with the earlier story of figure 3: less than one third of cartels lie with-
in the ‘literal oligopoly’ A area, and about a quarter are located in the unconcen-
trated C and D areas: clearly, explicit collusion can occur within relatively
unconcentrated groups of firms.
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The contrast is sharpened in figure 6(b) which shows the full scatter, with the
fitted curves from our earlier merger analysis superimposed. This focuses more
precisely on asymmetries, and it unambiguously establishes that size inequalities
are far more pronounced than those found in our earlier coordinated effect merg-
ers. Only five cartels lie within the region of collectively dominant mergers; 11
present structures which would have been judged to be singly dominant had they
been the outcome of a merger, and the remaining 25 (i.e. 60 percent) would not
have been judged to involve either collective or single dominance.
Generally, although it is apparent that a sizeable proportion of cartels do pres-
ent rough symmetry between S1 and S2 (lying fairly close to the symmetry diag-
onal), a sizeable proportion do not and this calls into question whether symme-
try of market shares is a pervasive feature of real world cartels.
Indeed, it is tempting to speculate from this figure that we can identify three
broad types of cartel structure:
• “Tacit-collusive compatible”—in the very limited sense implied by this
paper, i.e. consistent with structures identified by the EC as conducive
to coordinated effects mergers. Such cartels amount to broadly sym-
metric concentrated duopolies.
• “Dominant leader”—with the largest firm accounting for roughly 50
percent of the cartels’ sales, and its largest rival typically much smaller
(say 20 percent or less).
• “Unconcentrated”—with neither of the largest firms accounting for
much more than 40 percent or 30 percent, and usually much less. This
type is fairly heterogeneous, including five or six cartels which might
be categorized as triopoly or quadropoly, but the other 20 entailing
very significant fringes.
It would be imprudent to push this typology too far—there is undoubtedly
some fuzziness at the edges of the three types, and there are, no doubt, impreci-
sions in the raw market share data on which it is based. However, we believe the
typology provides a very convenient framework within which to draw some of
our main implications and conclusions.
VII. Implications and Conclusions
Our purpose has been to confront our previous findings on the market structur-
al characteristics of coordinated effects EC merger cases, as a proxy for tacit col-
lusion, with what is known from two quite separate empirical literatures—on the
one hand, experimental research on tacit collusion, and, on the other hand, the
observed market structures of some real world cartels. Underlying this purpose is
a desire to assess the empirical similarities between explicit and tacit collusion in
Stephen Davies and Matthew Olczak
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the light of a general practice among economists to assume that both phenome-
na can be understood by what is essentially the same model—the repeated game.
So what have we learned, and what does this suggest for future research?
Putting aside some very important caveats for the moment, our results suggest
the following:
• EC coordinated effect merger decisions and our review of the experi-
mental evidence suggests that tacit collusion is rare with more than
two firms, and without symmetry.
• EC cartel cases suggest that explicit collusion very often involves more
than two firms, a ‘typical’ number might be five or six, but very often
it is much more. Size asymmetries are often quite pronounced within
cartels.
This can be developed by drawing on the tentative typology of the previous
section as follows. In answer to one of our opening questions, are tacit and overt
collusion substitutes? The answer may be yes, but only for a small subset of car-
tels—the tacit collusive compatible subset that involves just two, roughly equal
players. For this subset, a further set of questions follow naturally: why did the
firms involved opt for an illegal cartel, when a similar outcome might have been
attainable tacitly? Did they emerge historically in the wake of a break-down in a
tacit collusion? (This would be consistent with Harrington’s46 evidence that
prices tend to fall prior to the formation of a
cartel.) Analogously, once broken, is overt
replaced by tacit collusion?
Turning to the dominant firm subset again,
was it the dominant firm who was the ring-
leader? If yes, then why did it choose to instigate a cartel, rather than relying on
the cause of its dominance (perhaps a cost advantage or a first-mover advantage)
to ensure compliance of its smaller rivals in a non-aggressive tacit understand-
ing? Moreover, are the internal mechanisms employed in this type of cartel dis-
tinctively different from those observed in other cartels?
Finally, for the unconcentrated subset, the salient question is: How were these
cartels able to form and survive, given that they exhibited neither of the gener-
ally expected characteristics of fewness and similarity?
These questions are as real for the academician as they are for the policy prac-
titioner. Probably the most fundamental distinction between overt and tacit col-
lusion is that meaningful explicit communication is possible in the former but
not the latter. From the existence of the unconcentrated subset, it would appear
that communication may often considerably extend the feasible boundaries for
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ANALOGOUSLY, ONCE BROKEN,
IS OVERT REPLACED
BY TACIT COLLUSION?
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an aspiring cartel with respect to both fewness and asymmetries, but how is this
reconciled with existing theory? The experimental papers we have reviewed
above are meticulous in not allowing any communication among participants. Is
it possible in future work to relax this restriction in a way that simulates the sort
of informal information exchange which, while falling short of hard evidence
recognized by the Court, might yet extend the boundary of structures within
which tacitly collusive outcomes emerge? Returning to our own work on merg-
ers with coordinated effects, is it simply that the CA (in our case, the European
Commission) has been over-cautious in employing the coordinated effects theo-
ry of harm in its decisions?
We believe that each of the questions posed above merits further research, and
therefore endorse Harrington’s second sentence below:
“. . .Having drawn this distinction between explicit and tacit collusion, I am
disappointed to say that, due to inadequacies in the underlying theory, the
ensuing analysis will largely ignore it. Nevertheless, it is important to keep
this distinction in the back of our mind and hopefully it’ll move to the front
of our collective mind in future research.”47
We hope that the current paper will help nudge the topic closer towards the
front of the agenda. 
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